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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - Infants - Federal Courts -
State Must Offer Clear and Convincing Proof of Unfitness
to Cut Off Parental Rights. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S.
745 (1982).
Nothing represents a more dramatic clash among the
competing interests of parents, children and the state than a
conflict resulting in the permanent and irrevocable termina-
tion of parental fights. In Santosky v. Kramer' the United
States Supreme Court invalidated a New York statute al-
lowing parents' fights to be terminated after a finding of per-
manent neglect by a fair preponderance of the evidence.2
The Santosky Court held that the New York law violated
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment,3 which
requires clear and convincing proof to properly balance the
interests of the parents and the state.4 Such a standard "ade-
quately conveys to the factfinder the level of subjective cer-
tainty about his conclusions necessary to satisfy due
process."5
The primary influence of Santosky will not be in its hold-
ing on the standard of proof. The majority of jurisdictions
already require clear and convincing proof of parental unfit-
ness. More important than the burden of proof holding are
1. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
2. Id at 768.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
4. 455 U.S. at 747-48.
5. Id at 769.
6. ALASKA STAT. § 47.1-.080(c)(3) (1979); CAL. CIV. CODE § 232(a)(7) (West
Supp. 1982); GA. CODE § 24A-2201(c) (1981); IOWA CODE ANN. § 600A.8 (Supp.
1981); ME. REv. STAT. ANN., tit. 22, § 4055.1(B)(2) (Supp. 1982); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 722.25 (Supp. 1982); Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.447.2(2) (Vernon Supp. 1982);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-7-4(J) (Supp. 1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.30(e) (Supp.
1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.35 (Page 1976 & Supp. 1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 15-7(d) (1981); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-246(d) (Supp. 1981); VA. CODE § 16.1-
283(B) (1982); W. VA. CODE § 49-6-2(c) (1980); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.3 1(1) (West
Supp. 1982-1983).
In addition, the following cases mandated clear and convincing evidence or its
equivalent: Dale County Dep't of Pensions & Security v. Robles, 368 So. 2d 39, 42
(Ala. Civ. App. 1979); Harper v. Caskin, 265 Ark. 558, 560-61, 580 S.W.2d 176, 178
(1979); In re J.S.R., 374 A.2d 860, 864 (D.C. 1977); Torres v. Van Eepoel, 98 So. 2d
735, 737 (Fla. 1957); Blakey v. Blakey, 72 Ill. App. 3d 946, 947, 391 N.E.2d 222, 223
(1979); In re Kems, 225 Kan. 746, 753, 594 P.2d 187, 193 (1979); In re Souz, 204 Neb.
503, 510, 283 N.W.2d 48, 52 (1979); J. & E. v. M. & F., 157 N.J. Super. 478, 489, 385
A.2d 240, 246 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978); In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex.
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the Santosky Court's statements on the interests of children.
Noteworthy in this context is the fact that the majority in
Santosky did not regard the interests of children as separate
from the interests of their parents until after the parents are
found unfit.7
This note will review the decision and place it in the con-
text of other recent Supreme Court decisions balancing the
interests of the family and of the state. It will also examine
the impact of Santosky on the rights of children.
I. THE FACTUAL SETrING
In October 1978 the Ulster County (New York) Depart-
ment of Social Services petitioned to terminate the rights of
John Santosky II and Annie Santosky to three of their minor
children who had been in foster care for several years.8 The
Department had removed the oldest child to a foster home
in 1973. Ten months later the second child was taken to a
foster home, and on the same day Mrs. Santosky gave birth
to a third child who was transferred to state custody after
only three days "to avoid imminent danger to his life or
health." 9 During the next four years Mrs. Santosky bore two
other children. Although these two children remained in the
Santoskys' custody, the Department came to the conclusion
that the family could not be rehabilitated despite economic,
medical and counseling assistance. It decided that the three
1980); In re Pitts, 535 P.2d 1244, 1248 (Utah 1975); In re Sego, 82 Wash. 2d 736, 739,
513 P.2d 831, 833 (1973); In re X, Y, Z, 607 P.2d 911, 919 (Wyo. 1980).
Two states require the stricter standard of beyond a reasonable doubt: State v.
Robert H., 118 N.H. 713, 716, 393 A.2d 1387, 1389 (1978); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 13:1603.A (West Supp. 1982). See also Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C.
§ 1912(f) (Supp. V 1982).
Only four state statutes allow a preponderance of the evidence standard: ARIZ.
Rav. STAT. ANN. § 8-537(b) (1974); COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-3-106 (1973 & Supp.
1981); IDAHO CODE § 16-2009 (1979); NEV. REv. STAT. § 128.090 (1979).
The remaining states do not have a standard of proof for termination hearings.
These states are: Connecticut, Hawaii, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Mississippi, South Carolina and Vermont. In fact, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachu-
setts and Vermont do not have a mechanism to provide for involuntary termination.
7. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 760.
8. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 752 (1982).
9. Id at 751.
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children in placement could not be returned to the home.10
After a bifurcated permanent neglect hearing," the trial
judge determined that the best interests of the children re-
quired the permanent termination of the Santoskys' parental
rights.12 The parents appealed this ruling on the ground that
the fair preponderance of the evidence standard specified in
the New York law' 3 was unconstitutional.
The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, af-
firmed the trial court,' 4 and the New York Court of Appeals
dismissed the parents' petition on the ground that "no sub-
stantial constitutional question is directly involved."' 5 The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider
the petitioners' challenge.' 6  In a five-to-four decision, the
Court reversed, holding that New York's fair preponderance
standard did not satisfy due process requirements.17 To ter-
inate parental rights, the level of proof must be clear and
convincing. 1
II. BEFORE SANTOSKY: SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
AFFECTING FAMILY RIGHTS
A. Family Rights in General
Traditionally, the realm of family law has been left to the
10. Id See also In re John W., 63 A.D.2d 750,751,404 N.Y.S.2d 717,719 (1978);
In re Santosky, 89 Misc. 2d 730, 393 N.Y.S.2d 486 (1977).
11. New York bifurcates its permanent neglect proceeding into "factfnding" and
"dispositional" hearings. N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT §§ 622-623 (McKinney 1975 & Supp.
1982).
Wisconsin provides a bifurcated procedure for the termination of parental rights.
Wis. STAT. §§ 48.424, .427 (1981-1982). At the factfinding hearing the trier of fact
must determine whether the grounds exist for termination under either § 48.41 or
§ 48.415. If the grounds for termination are found, the court proceeds to hear evi-
dence and motions related to dispositions. Id § 48.424(4). The dispositional alterna-
tives are enumerated in § 48.427.
12. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 752.
13. N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 622 (McKinney 1975).
14. In re John W., 63 A.D.2d 750, 751, 404 N.Y.S.2d 717, 719 (1978), aff'd sub
nom. In re John AA, 75 A.D.2d 910, 427 N.Y.S.2d 319 (1980), vacated and remanded
sub noma. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
15. The dismissal is noted sub nom in In re Apel, 432 N.Y.S.2d 1031 (1980)
(unpublished).
16. 450 U.S. 993 (1981).
17. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 765.
18. Id at 769.
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prerogative of state and local governments.' 9 However, the
states' power to administer family law is not entirely free
from constitutional limitations, and some commentators pre-
dict a gradual constitutionalization of family law.20  The
Supreme Court's decisions in the field of domestic relations
have recognized as "fundamental" the right of individual
21 22autonomy in activities relating to marriage, procreation,
contraception, 23 abortion,24 family relationships25 and the
rearing and education of children.26
The origin of constitutional protection of family rights
has been traced to Meyer v. Nebraska27 and Pierce v. Society
of Sisters.28 In Meyer the Court held that a state statute
which forbade the teaching of foreign languages to grade
school children violated a liberty interest accorded parents
under the fourteenth amendment.29  A similar interest was
protected by the holding in Pierce which struck down a state
19. See, e.g., De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956) (dictum) ("[T]here is no
federal law of domestic relations, which is primarily a matter of state concern.").
20. See generally Developments in the Law- The Constitution and the Family, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1156 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Developments in the Law]. See also
Kirkpatrick v. Christian Homes of Abilene, Inc., 628 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. Civ. App.
1982), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3525 (U.S. Jan. 18, 1983) (No. 82-647) (where the
Court will consider burden of proof issue in case involving voluntary legitimation
proceedings brought by unwed father); In re Jessica XX, 77 A.D.2d 381, 434 N.Y.S.2d
772 (1980), aff'd, 54 N.Y.2d 417, 430 N.E.2d 896, 446 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1981), review
grantedsub nom. Lehr v. Robertson, 102 S. Ct. 2231 (1982) (Court granted review but
postponed consideration of question ofjurisdiction to hearing of case on merits; issue
presented is whether a statute allowing adoption of an illegitimate child without no-
tice to the purported father violated father's due process rights).
21. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (law prohibiting interracial
marriage unconstitutional); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (state may not regu-
late intimacies of marriage).
22. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (Court invalidated state
statute providing for sterilization of persons convicted of two or more felonies involv-
ing moral turpitude).
23. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (state cannot make
use of contraceptives by a married person a crime).
24. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (woman may decide whether or
not to terminate pregnancy in first trimester).
25. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 48 U.S. 52 (1976) (rejecting abso-
lute parental veto over a minor's abortion).
26. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (parents can select language
their children will be taught at private school).
27. Id
28. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
29. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I (the due process clause, which states: "nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law").
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law requiring all children to attend public schools. 30 The
liberty interest protected in these cases is "not merely free-
dom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual
to marry, establish a home, and bring up children." 3' The
focus of this interest is the right of the parents to the "cus-
tody, care and nurture of the child. ' 32 This principle contin-
ues to have constitutional validity.33
In addition to acknowledging the parents' right to pri-
vacy in childrearing, recent Supreme Court cases have rec-
ognized a right to family privacy.34 Family privacy protects
the interest of family members in avoiding unjustified state
interference which undermines the integrity and stability of
the family as an institution.35 It upholds the right to partici-
pate with others in an intimate, familial relationship.36 As
such, family privacy is a relational rather than an individual
interest.
The state, however, has traditionally had the authority to
intervene in family matters under its police power37 or
parens patriae power.38 The police power allows state inter-
vention to protect the health, education and welfare of indi-
viduals to enable them to become informed and competent
citizens.39 Parens patriae, on the other hand, permits state
action to promote the best interests of certain individuals
30. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 530-32.
31. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
32. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
33. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (child not entitled to hearing
before being committed to state mental hospital by parents); Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 654 (1972) (unwed father entitled to hearing before child may be removed from
his custody); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (Amish parents not required to
send children to school beyond eighth grade).
34. See, e.g., Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977)
("[T]he importance of the familial relationship. . . stems from the emotional attach-
ments that derive from the intimacy of daily association."); Moore v. City of E. Cleve-
land, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) ("Our decisions establish that the Constitution protects
the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.").
35. See generally Garvey, Child, Parent, State and the Due Process Clause: An
Essay on the Supreme Court's Recent Work, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 769, 804-22 (1978).
36. See Developments in the Law, supra note 20, at 1198-1248.
37. Id at 1214-16.
38. Id at 1221-42.
39. See, e.g., id at 1198-99.
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who lack the capacity to act on their own behalf.40
Three generally accepted beliefs influence the exercise of
parens patriae powers on behalf of children. The first is that
children lack the capacity and maturity to make certain deci-
sions for themselves, so the state must protect their well-be-
ing.4' Second, parents are presumptively best able to make
important decisions concerning the welfare of their chil-
dren.4 z Thus, before the state may intervene, it must show
that the parents are unfit or unwilling to exercise their right
to care and control.43  Finally, the state should exercise its
parens patriae power only to further the best interest of the
child.44 The doctrine of "best interest" is generally a focal
point for decisionmaking in child custody disputes pursuant
to a divorce.45 This doctrine implicitly recognizes that each
child is unique and that, ideally, the court should give pri-
mary regard to the child's individual needs.46
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the
child as an individual who has constitutionally protected
rights by extending the safeguards of due process to minors
in both crimina147 and civil48 cases. The child has a right to
40. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1974) (state's parens patriae
interest sufficient to justify child labor law prohibiting child from distributing reli-
gious materials). See generaly Custer, The Origin of the Doctrine of Parens Patriae,
27 EMORY L.J. 195 (1978).
41. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 705 (1977) (Powell, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (restrictions on child's sexual ac-
tivity justified because in some areas child is not possessed of capacity for individual
choice).
42. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923).
43. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (dictum) ("We have little doubt
that the Due Process Clause would be offended '[i]f a State were to attempt to force
the breakup of a natural family, over the objections of the parents and their children,
without some showing of unfitness. . . .'" (quoting Smith v. Organization of Foster
Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862-63 (1977))).
44. See Developments in the Law, supra note 20, at 1199-1202.
45. See generaly Wald, State Interventions on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: A
Searchfor Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REV. 985 (1975); Comment, The Best In-
terest of the Child Doctrine in Wisconsin Custody Cases, 64 MARQ. L. REV. 343 (1980);
Comment, In the Child's Best Interests: Right of the Natural Parents in Child Place-
ment Proceedings, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. (1976).
46. See generally J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST IN-
TERESTS OF THE CHILD (1979).
47. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (minors entitled to standard of
proof of beyond a reasonable doubt in delinquency proceedings); In re Gault, 387
[Vol. 66:585
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privacy in making decisions regarding abortion4 9 and the use
of contraceptives.5 0 There is also support in case law and the
literature for the proposition that children have a privacy in-
terest in the family relationship because of their interest in
receiving parental guidance and support.5 I The rights of
children are discussed below in Part V.
B. Supreme Court Decisions Affecting Termination of
Parental Rights
It was not until 1981 that the Supreme Court considered
a termination of parental rights case specifically.5 2 The issue
of standard of proof in termination proceedings came before
the Court in 1980 in Doe v. Delaware,53 but the Doe Court
dismissed that case "for want of a properly presented federal
question. 54 In the next Term the Court again faced the ter-
mination issue in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services.55
In a five-to-four decision the Court held that due process
does not require the appointment of counsel for indigent
parents in every termination of parental rights proceeding.
5 6
U.S. 1 (1967) (children have right to notice, right to counsel, right to remain silent and
right to confront and cross-examine witnesses in delinquency hearings). But see
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (children do not have right to jury
trial).
48. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (Court held unconstitutional
state law requiring parental consultation before minor may seek court order allowing
abortion).
49. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
50. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
51. See, e.g., Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977). See
generally Garvey, supra note 35; Keiter, Privacy, Children, and Their Parents: Re fec-
tions On and Beyond the Supreme Court's Approach, 66 MINN. L. REV. 459 (1982).
52. Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981). Only two lower
federal courts had addressed the issue of standard of proof in termination cases: Sims
v. State Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 438 F. Supp. 1179, 1194 (S.D. Tex. 1977), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979); Alsager v. District Ct.,
406 F. Supp. 10, 25 (S.D. Iowa 1975), aff'don other groundr, 545 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir.
1976). See also Bell, Termination of Parental Rights: Recent Judicial and Legislative
Trends, 30 EMORY L.J. 1065, 1087-1106 (1981) (summary of recent cases which were
parent initiated challenges to termination proceedings).
53. 450 U.S. 382 (1981).
54. Id at 382.
55. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
56. Id at 33. See Bell, supra note 52, at 1099-1101 (critique of Lassiter); Com-
ment, Appointment of Counsel in Parental Rights Termination Proceedings Is to Be De-
termined on a Case-by-Case Basis, 13 RUTGERS L.J. 177 (1981).
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This decision set forth the general principle that there is no
right to appointed counsel in the absence of at least a poten-
tial deprivation of physical liberty.-7  The Court then
weighed the three factors used in Matthews v. Eldridge58 to
determine what procedural due process requires: the private
interests at stake, the government interest and the risk that
the procedures used will lead to erroneous factfinding.5 9 The
Lassiter majority concluded that the presumption against a
right to counsel was not outweighed by the requirements of a
termination hearing, although special circumstances may re-
quire that parents be represented by an attorney.60 The
Lassiter decision, by applying the Eldridge factors to termi-
nation proceedings, set the stage for the due process analysis
in Santosky which decided the question of the standard of
proof required for terminations.
III. THE SAVTOSKY OPINION
Santosky v. Kramer61 became the second termination of
parental rights case to be decided by the United States
Supreme Court. Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun
first addressed the question of whether process is due parents
in proceedings to terminate their parental rights. His opin-
ion relied on Lassiter for the answer.62 There the Court had
acknowledged "that state intervention to terminate the rela-
tionship between [a parent] and [the] child must be accom-
plished by procedures meeting the requisites of the Due
Process Clause.' 63
The Court then determined the level of process necessary
to satisfy the constitutional requirement. The majority again
relied on Lassiter in deciding that the requisite due process
in terminations is to be determined by balancing the three
57. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 25.
58. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (termination of social security benefits without a
prior evidentiary hearing does not violate due process).
59. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27 (citing Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335).
60. Lassiter, 425 U.S. at 31.
61. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
62. Id at 752-53.
63. Id at 753 (quoting Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., .452 U.S. 18, 37
(1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
[Vol. 66:585
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Eldridge factors. 4 Accordingly, the Court in Santosky
weighed the private interest of the parents, the interest of the
government and the risk of error.
The majority prefaced their application of this balancing
test by considering the function of a burden of proof. Citing
Add,'nglon v. Texas,65 in which the Court established clear
and convincing as the standard of proof in state involuntary
commitment proceedings, the Court stated that the function
of the burden of proof is "to 'instruct the factfinder concern-ing the degree of confidence our society thinks he should
have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular
type of adjudication.' "66 When the preponderance of the
evidence standard is used, money damages are usually in is-
sue.67 In Addington, where the middle burden was required,
a stigma to the person was at stake.68 When life or liberty is
in jeopardy the beyond a reasonable doubt standard is usu-
ally required.69 The ultimate determination of the standard
which will satisfy procedural due process is a matter of fed-
eral law, even though a state might specify its own proce-
dures.7 ° Moreover, this determination is traditionally within
the province of the judiciary.71
A. The Private Interest
To initiate the balancing process, the Santosky Court
stated that the parents' interest in the care and custody of
their children is the most important private interest to be
considered.72 The criterion for assessing the importance of
the private interest is the "extent to which. . . [the individ-
ual] may be 'condemned to suffer grievous loss.' ",T The
Court concluded that the private interest affected by termi-
64. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 754.
65. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
66. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 754-55 (quoting Addington, 441 U.S. at 423).
67. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 755.
68. Addington, 441 U.S. at 426. The "clear and convincing" standard has also
been adopted by the Court for application in cases involving gender bias. See Missis-
sippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 102 S. Ct. 3331 (1982).
69. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 755.
70. Id
71. Id at 755-56.
72. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758-59 (1982).
73. Id at 758 (quoting Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970)).
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nations weighs heavily against a preponderance of the evi-
dence standard74 because the parent's right to custody of his
or her children is more precious than a mere property
right,75 and because terminations not only infringe upon the
parent's liberty interest, but seek to end it finally and
irrevocably.76
Significantly, in assessing the Eldridge private interest
factor, the majority did not consider the interest of the child
in having a safe and permanent home. Instead, the majority
decided that the child shares the parents' interest at the
factfinding stage. 77 Justice Blackmun stated: "After the
state has established parental unfitness at the initial proceed-
ing, the Court may assume at the dispositional stage that the
interests of the child and the natural parent do diverge. 78
This conclusion that the child shares the parents' interest at
the factfinding stage was criticized by the dissent79 and has
serious consequences for the rights of children which will be
discussed below in Part V.
B. The Government Interest
The Court found two relevant government interests in
terminations. One is the state's parens patriae interest in
promoting the health and well-being of children.80 The sec-
ond is a fiscal and administrative interest in reducing the
cost and burdens of the termination process.8' Reasoning
that the parens patriae interest can only coincide with the
parents' interest in preservation of the family unit at the
factfinding hearing, the Court excluded this factor from the
balance of interests required by Eldridge.82 The Court deter-
74. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 759.
75. Id at 758-59.
76. Id at 759.
77. Id at 760-61.
78. Id at 760 (emphasis in original).
79. Id at 787-91 & n.13 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
80. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982). "Parens patriae," meaning
"parent of the country," refers to the role of the state as sovereign and guardian of
persons under a legal disability to act for themselves, such as minors. See West Vir-
ginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1089 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871
(1971). See generally Custer, supra note 40.
81. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982).
82. Id
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
mined that the second government interest, administrative
and fiscal efficiency, does not present an obstacle to a higher
standard of proof.
C The Fair Allocation of Risk
The third Eldridge factor to be considered when selecting
a minimum standard of proof is the fair allocation of risk.
Because the majority determined that the factfinding phase
of the termination proceeding is "an adversary contest be-
tween the State and the natural parents,"83 it weighed only
the risk of erroneous factfinding as it related to those two
parties. The Court identified several factors which, in its
view, magnify the risk of erroneous factfinding against the
parents, including the subjective values of the judge, the
greater resources of the state and the limited litigation op-
tions of the parents.84 Coupling these factors with a prepon-
derance of the evidence standard creates a significant
prospect of erroneous termination, according to the major-
ity8 5 It is noteworthy that the Court stressed, in its assess-
ment of risks, that the standard of proof should not be
construed as allocating the risk of error between the parents
and the child.86
D. The Standard of Proof
Balancing the interests of the parents and of the state
against the risk of erroneous factflnding, the Santosky Court
held that the fair preponderance of the evidence standard of
proof violates the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.87 The question of what standard of proof is
constitutionally mandated is resolved first of all by the ma-
jority's evaluation of the reasonable doubt standard. Look-
ing again to Addington ,88 the Court decided that the highest
83. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 761 (1982).
84. Id at 762-64.
85. Id at 764.
86. Id at 765. The Supreme Court characterized as "fundamentally mistaken"
the suggestion of the New York court that "a preponderance standard properly allo-
cates the risk of error between the parents and the child." Id (footnote omitted) (em-
phasis in original).
87. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 768 (1982).
88. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
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standard of proof is inappropriate for terminations89 because
that standard should not be applied "'too broadly or casu-
ally in noncriminal cases'"90 and because the type of evi-
dence involved is rarely susceptible to proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.9'
Second, noting that a majority of states have established
clear and convincing as the standard of proof in termina-
tions,92 the Court held that "such a standard adequately con-
veys to the factfinder the level of subjective certainty about
his factual conclusions necessary to satisfy due process. '93
The Santosky decision leaves to the states the option of
whether to require an even stricter standard.94
IV. THE DISSENT
Although Justice Rehnquist, in the dissenting opinion,95
expressed concern that the majority "invites further intru-
sion into every facet of family life,"' 96 his support of the fair
preponderance standard of proof contradicts that concern.
His analysis is more clearly understood in the context of his
view that states should have considerable freedom in devel-
oping legislation and programs to meet the needs of their
89. San/osky, 455 U.S. at 769 (noting that the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978,
25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) (1976 & Supp. 1981) requires the "beyond a reasonable doubt"
standard for terminations of the parental rights of American Indian parents).
90. Saniosky, 455 U.S. at 768 (quoting 4ddington, 441 U.S. at 428).
91. San/osky, 455 U.S. at 768-69 (quotingAdding/on, 441 U.S. at 429-30 (1979)).
It is interesting to note that the Court does not clarify in Adding/on to what extent, if
any, its holding modifies Winshop. In In re Winshop the Court reasoned that a higher
standard of proof was required in juvenile delinquency adjudications because, as in
adult criminal prosecutions, the consequences of the proceedings are a loss of liberty
and a stigmatization by the community. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365-66 (1970).
Addington, on the other hand, held that, although the individual would suffer a loss of
liberty and stigmatization from involuntary commitment to a mental health facility,
the Constitution does not mandate the highest standard of proof. In civil commit-
ments the Court concluded that beyond a reasonable doubt was inappropriate be-
cause that standard should not be applied too broadly in noncriminal cases and
psychiatric evidence is not susceptible to proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Adding-
ton, 441 U.S. at 428-30.
92. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769.
93. Id
94. Id at 769-70.
95. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 770 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Jus-
tice Rehnquist was joined in his dissent by Chief Justice Burger and Justices White
and O'Connor.
96. Id
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citizens, particularly in the area of domestic relations.97
Thus, the dissent found that New York provides comprehen-
sive services for families in need of them and that its policies
and procedures represent a "good faith effort" to balance the
interests of the parent, the child and the state. 98
The dissent also argued that the fair preponderance stan-
dard of proof selected by the New York Legislature repre-
sented a constitutionally permissible balance of the interests
involved in termination proceedings. 99 Justice Rehnquist
defined these interests as the parents' interest in family integ-
rity, the child's interest in a stable and loving home and the
state's interest in the welfare of children.'l° The dissent
claimed that none of these interests is "so clearly paramount
as to require the risk of error to be allocated to one side or
the other."'' 1 Thus, fair preponderance provides "funda-
mental fairness" to parents in termination proceedings. 10 2 In
support of this conclusion, the dissent stressed the impor-
tance of considering the child's interest at the initial stage of
the proceedings.0 3 Justice Rehnquist warned of the severe
consequences which may befall a child who is a victim of
erroneous factflnding and is forced into unduly long stays in
the foster care system.1°4
V. THE IMPACT OF SANTOSKY ON CHILDREN'S RIGHTS
It is likely that Santosky will be noted less for setting a
standard of proof in termination of parental rights hearings
and more for the Court's enunciation of general considera-
tions and beliefs concerning the rights of children in relation
to those of their parents. 05 The Court in Santosky deter-
mined that at the factfinding stage of the proceedings the
interests of the parent and of the child coincide, asserting
97. Id at 771. The dissent stated, "We have found ... that leaving the State free
to experiment with various remedies has produced novel approaches and promising
progress." Id
98. Id at 771-72.
99. Id at 785.
100. Id at 787-90.
101. Id at 790-91.
102. Id at 770-7 1.
103. Id at 788 n.13.
104. Id at 789-90 n.15.
105. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
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that both parties have a vital interest in preventing an erro-
neous termination of the parent-child relationship. 10 6 Fur-
thermore, the Court stated that any parens patriae interest of
the state "arises only at the dispositional phase, after the par-
ents have been found unfit."'' 0 7 This analysis has legal and
symbolic implications for children. First, although the child
shares the parents' interest in preventing erroneous termina-
tions, he or she may also have an interest in the termination
of a nonviable parental bond. 08 This interest should also
have been weighed by the Court in the Eldridge balancing
process either in connection with the parens patriae role of
the state or as part of a broader consideration of the private
interests of the child. 0 9 Second, the Court's characterization
of the parens patriae role in terminations is inconsistent with
the tradition of that doctrine through which the state asserts
the interests of individuals unable to act on their own
behalf."10
A. The Child's Interest
The Court's failure to fully explore the interests of the
child and recognize them at the adjudicatory phase is not
surprising in view of the protection it traditionally affords
parental rights.II' The rights of natural mothers and fathers
to the care, control and companionship of their children
have been regarded as sacred by courts." 2 Courts have rec-
106. Id at 760.
107. Id at 767 n.17 (emphasis in original).
108. Id at 788 n.13 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The dissent noted:
The child has an interest in the outcome of the factfinding hearing independ-
ent of that of the parent. . . . [Tihe child's interest in continuation of the
family unit exists only to the extent that such a continuation would not be
harmful to him. An error in thefacofnding hearing that results in a failure to
terminate a parent-child relationship which rightfully should be terminated
may well detrimentally affect the child.
Id
109. Id at 790 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). ("Few could doubt that the most valu-
able resource of a self-governing society is its population of children who will one day
become adults and themselves assume the responsibility of self-governance.")
110. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
I 11. See supra text accompanying notes 27-36.
112. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). See also Com-
ment, Proceedings to Terminate Parental Rights: Too Much or Too Little Protectionfor
Parental Rights?, 16 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 337, 337 (1976).
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ognized, however, that these rights carry responsibilities
which entail a duty to provide proper care and protection for
the child." 3 Although the duty of parents to provide a mini-
mally adequate environment is important, the corresponding
rights of children have generally yielded to parents' rights. "14
By presuming that the interests of parents and children
coincide at the adjudicatory phase, it is arguable that the
Court undervalued the basic interest of the child in growing
up in a stable and secure environment. It has been stated
that:
[C]hildren have a strong interest in having a secure and
stable home. Such a home must not only be secure and
stable in the sense that it provides a physically secure and
emotionally stable environment, but it must also be secure
and stable in the sense that it will be relatively permanent.
Permanence is important in order for the child to develop a
normal family relationship and to avoid the anxiety and
developmental problems that can be caused by uncertainty
in care and custodial arrangements.' 5
In actions to terminate parental rights, then, the point
may be reached where the child's interest and the parent's
interest diverge." 6 If the family is functional or is likely to
become functional with rehabilitative services, the child's in-
terest in preserving the familial bond coincides with the par-
ent's interest in custody and control. But if the family is
nonfunctional or nonexistent, the child's interest in a safe
and secure environment may conflict with the parent's inter-
est in preserving the parental bond. In that case the interests
of the child should be recognized at the factfrnding stage be-
cause of the consequences for the child at this point.' 17
The Santosky majority, however, did not analyze the
113. See, e.g., Donnelly v. Donnelly, 4 Mass. App. Ct. 162, 344 N.E.2d 195
(1979).
114. See supra text accompanying notes 27-36. See also Areen, Intervention Be-
tween Parent and Child" A Reappraisal of the State'r Role in Child Neglect andAbuse
Cases, 63 GEo. L.J. 887, 892-93 (1975).
115. Comment, Appointing Counselfor the Child in Action to Terminate Parental
Rights, 70 CALIF. L. REv. 481, 488-89 (1982) (footnotes omitted).
116. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 787-90 & n.13 (1982) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
117. Id See also Alsager v. District Ct., 406 F. Supp. 10, 23-24 (S.D. Iowa 1975)
(termination recommended if consequences of allowing parent-child relationship to
continue are more severe than severing that bond), af'dper curiam, 545 F.2d 1137
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separate interests of the child. The Court instead focused on
the common interest of parent and child "in preventing erro-
neous termination of their natural relationship."'"18 In this
context, the Court noted the serious consequences of termi-
nation, including permanent loss of support and mainte-
nance, loss of the right to inherit and all other rights inherent
in the legal parent-child relationship."l9 The Court's empha-
sis on the common interest of parent and child in preventing
termination is also supported on the ground that state inter-
ference with parental ties may cause the child to experience
serious emotional pains whether the parent is "fit" or "un-
fit." ' 20 Furthermore, this focus on the common interest and
the reluctance to assess the child's independent interest may
be rooted in the difficulty courts have in determining "unfit-
ness." ' 2' Even experts cannot agree on what parental behav-
ior harms the child: 22 "[N]o generally accepted standards
exist detailing conduct that will or will not cause emotional
harm. In fact, little evidence indicates that a parent's values
or immoral conduct will harm the child at all. No consensus
exists on the best way to raise children."'' 23 In light of the
serious consequences of termination and the difficulty in de-
termining whether parental bonds should be permanently
severed, it is not surprising that the Court failed to recognize
the independent interests of the child at the factfinding stage
but focused instead on the common interest of parent and
child "in preventing erroneous termination."'124
B. Parens Patriae Role of the State
The Court has also stated that: "'Since the State has an
urgent interest in the welfare of the child, it shares the par-
ent's interest in an accurate and just decision at thefacqqnd-
(8th Cir. 1976). See generally Mnookin, Foster Care - For Whose Best Interests?, 43
HARV. ED. REV. 160 (1973).
118. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 760 (footnote omitted).
119. Id at760-61 n.11.
120. Comment, Termination of Parental Rights, 26 ST. Louis L.J. 915, 926 (1982)
(citing J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, supra note 46, at 19-26).
121. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, supra note 46, at 19-26.
122. Comment, supra note 120, at 925.
123. Id (footnotes omitted).
124. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 760 (footnote omitted).
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ing proceeding.' 125 The Court recognized that, under the
doctrine of parens patriae, the state's goal in enacting child
welfare legislation is to provide the child with a permanent
home. 126 Yet, because the state's interest favors preservation
of positive family relationships, the Court concluded that its
role in termination proceedings arises only after the adjudi-
catory phase. 27 Although this analysis is consistent with the
Court's characterization of the factfinding hearing as an ad-
versary contest between the state and the parents, 28 it fails
to recognize that the state's primary function in terminations
is to promote the welfare of the child at all phases of the
proceedings. 29 Because the child's interest in preserving the
family unit exists only to the extent that its preservation
would not be harmful to him or her, 30 the state's interest has
a broader focus than preventing erroneous terminations.
The state's role is "'to provide procedures not only assuring
that the rights of the natural parents are protected, but also,
where positive, nurturing parent-child relationships no
longer exist, furthering the best interests, needs, and rights of
the child . . ' "131
Nevertheless, Santosky's conclusion that the state's
parens patriae interest coincides with the parents' interest is
in accord with a trend in Supreme Court decisions dating
from the early 1960's minimizing the importance of the
state's parens patriae role. These decisions, however, have
not distinguished that role in juvenile delinquency cases
from that in child protective cases.
Until the Court's decision in In re Gault 32 in 1967, state
laws dealing with neglect, abuse, termination and delin-
quency were subject to minimal judicial scrutiny. 33 Gault
changed that situation by specifying what procedural protec-
125. Id at 766 (quoting Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27
(1981)) (emphasis in original).
126. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766-67 & n.17 (1982).
127. Id at 767.
128. Id at 761.
129. Id at 790 n.16 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
130. Id at 788 n.13 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
131. Id at 791 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-
b(1)(b) (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1982)).
132. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
133. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 16-29 (1978).
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tions were mandated in delinquency hearings in order to
protect children's rights which had not been sufficiently
guarded by the parens patriae rationale allowing benevolent
state intrusion into the lives of children and their families. 134
The Court subsequently held in In re Winship 135 that delin-
quency adjudicatory proceedings must use a beyond a rea-
sonable doubt standard of proof. 36 Breeds v. Jones137 used
the Gault rationale to hold that double jeopardy protection
must be accorded a minor accused of a crime. 38
A moderate resurgence of the parens patriae doctrine can
be seen in Supreme Court decisions in the 1970's. For exam-
ple, McKeiver v. Pennsylvania'39 held that a jury trial is not
constitutionally mandated in juvenile delinquency proceed-
ings. The Court stated that "[t]here is a possibility, at least,
that the jury trial, if required. . . will put an effective end to
what has been the idealistic prospect of an intimate, infor-
mal protective proceeding."'' 40 Subsequently, in Parham v.
JR.. '1 the Court concluded that the child's due process
rights were not violated by a state statute which permitted
the commitment of a minor to a mental health facility at the
parents' request without a formal hearing. 142 The Court rea-
soned that the state's parens patriae interest in assisting par-
ents to obtain treatment for their children was consistent
with informal admissions procedures. 43
The impetus for these decisions may be the Court's in-
creasing distrust of the broad assumptions which underlie
the application of the parens patriae power of the state to
direct the lives of children and their parents.44 In the name
of rehabilitation and state "caring," the parens patriae power
was being invoked by the state to protect neither the rights of
the parent nor the welfare of the children. Instead it was
134. Gault, 387 U.S. at 16-31.
135. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
136. Id at 365-68.
137. 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
138. Id at 529.
139. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
140. Id at 545.
141. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
142. Id at 604.
143. Id at 605.
144. See Developments in the Law, supra note 20, at 1221-27.
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used to separate children from their parents informally and
with wide discretion or to commit children involuntarily to
institutions, schools, hospitals and group homes. 145
Further confusion concerning the application of parens
patriae exists because of the courts' failure to distinguish the
state's role in child protective cases from the state's role in
delinquency matters. 146 Such a distinction is necessary to
adequately assess the government's interest. 47 In delin-
quency proceedings the child has a liberty interest at stake
which has been accorded due process protection. 48 The
state's role is to proceed in a prosecutorial manner which
does not infringe upon this liberty interest. In neglect, de-
pendency or termination hearings the child has potentially
conflicting interests in being free from physical or emotional
harm and in receiving parental care and guidance.' 49 Thus,
in these cases the state's role should be to balance these in-
terests from the child's perspective to determine which dis-
positional alternative will be in his or her best interest or
which will be least detrimental to his or her well-being.' 50
VI. CONCLUSION
In Santosky v. Kramer'5 ' the United States Supreme
Court held that before a state may terminate the rights of
parents in their child, due process requires the state to sup-
port its allegations by at least clear and convincing evi-
dence.1 52 In reaching its decision, the Court ignored any
independent interest the child might have at the factfinding
stage of the proceedings. The Court instead focused on the
common interest of the parent, the child and the state "in
preventing erroneous terminations."'' 53 This point of view
has at least two noteworthy consequences. First, Santosky
reinforces the longstanding presumption favoring parents'
145. Id at 1226-27 (and cases cited therein).
146. Id at 1225.
147. Id
148. See supra notes 124-31 and accompanying text.
149. Sanlosky, 455 U.S. at 787-90 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
150. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, supra note 46.
151. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
152. Id at 769.
153. id at 760.
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right to the custody, control and companionship of their
children.15 4 Second, the decision signals continued modera-
tion in the Court's view of the state's parens patriae role,
particularly in actions which involve the conflicting interests
of children and their parents. 55
SUSAN E. SIMANEK
154. See generally McGough & Shindell, Coming ofAge: The Best Interest of the
Child Standard in Parent-Third Party Custody Disputes, 27 EMORY L.J. 209, 212-13 &
n.21 (1978) (and cases cited therein) (parental rights doctrine based on assumption
that unless parent is disqualified by proof of unfitness, the interests of the child are
best served by awarding child to parent).
155. See supra notes 123-42 and accompanying text.
